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Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES

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WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — per cent of the total, or about President Nixon has become \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of dissatisfied with the size, cost it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations, which are estimated at 200,000

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than \$80-

Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the air of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioac effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intense behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed s "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist talking with reporters, but fr views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men ret from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's disorganization of a nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos, put and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, about 10 per cent—\$500-million to